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Preface
The present book is the fi fth volume of the series Studies in the Philosophy of 
Law which has appeared since 2001. The previous three volumes had a mono-
graphic character, the last one being devoted to the various issues of bioethics, 
law and philosophy and the previous one to the topic of the economic analysis of 
law. Both of these were published in English. This volume is part of a research 
project “Biojurisprudence” pursued from 2007 through 2010 by the Department 
of Philosophy of Law and Legal Ethics at the Jagiellonian University and spon-
sored by the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education. Within the project 
our team has published many articles, monographs and edited works such as the 
Studies in the Philosophy of Law, vol. 4: Legal Philosophy and the Challenges of 
Biosciences (edited by J. Stelmach, M. Soniewicka and W. Załuski, Jagiellonian 
University Press, 2010). One monograph, entitled Evolutionary Foundations of 
Law was written by Dr. Wojciech Załuski and was published in both Polish and 
English in 2009. We have also prepared a joint monograph entitled Paradoxes of 
Legal Bioethics and which is forthcoming this year.
The present volume also has a monographic character and consists of two 
parts and an appendix. The fi rst part, entitled Legal Implications of Medical 
Advances, consists of four chapters that address the ethical and legal issues of 
the integration of new genetic technologies into medicine. 
In the fi rst chapter, George J. Annas discuss the daunting moral and intel-
lectual challenges of the genomics revolution, especially those concerned with 
eugenics, inequality and genism. He pays special attention to the dark side of 
genetics and demonstrates the possibility for a worst case scenario of species 
(genetic) suicide. Finally, he suggests the adoption of The Preservation of the 
Human Species treaty to prevent such risks. 
The idea of trans-humanism and human genetic engineering which was deep-
ly criticised by George J. Annas is presented from its positive side in the subse-
quent chapter by Michał Araszkiewicz. Araszkiewicz considers the problem of 
the ethical implications of human genetic engineering and presents a variety of 
issues of distributive justice in relation to human genetic engineering. He ap-
proaches the problem from the perspective of the Rawlsian theory of distributive 
justice in the controversial interpretation of two bioethicists, David Resnik and 
Colin Farrelly. 
Julia Stanek provides the most important information about genetic testing, 
its sorts and meaning. She also briefl y introduces the most frequently mentioned 
controversies concerning genetic testing, such as: free consent; access to genetic 
information; the right to know or not to know; privacy, commercialization and 
discrimination. 
The problem of discrimination based on genetic characteristics is further 
discussed in the fourth chapter by Marta Soniewicka. Soniewicka analyzes the 
meaning of genetic discrimination and demonstrates how it can manifest itself. 
She also discusses the main controversies that arise when the law preventing 
genetic discrimination is at stake. In the same manner as George J. Annas, she 
addresses the issue of unequal access to health resources and the controversies 
of eugenics. She also discusses the problem of discrimination in the dimension 
of insurance, employment, education and adoption. Finally, she analyzes the 
main controversies concerned with the prohibition of genetic discrimination in 
the example of laws prohibiting genetic discrimination in insurance, perhaps the 
deepest concern of legislators around the world.
The second part, entitled the Evolutionary Approach to the Normativity 
of Law, consists of six chapters that address the various issues the impact of 
biology, theory of evolution and neurosciences on law. 
Bartosz Brożek, in Some Remarks on the Naturalization of Law, tries to de-
velop a set of directives for any project of the naturalization of law. He does so 
by analyzing two case studies: the psychological theory of law developed by Leon 
Petrażycki and the evolutionary conception of law recently proposed by Wojciech 
Załuski. Brożek claims that these attempts – especially that of Petrażycki – dis-
play certain drawbacks. The analysis of these defi ciencies leads to the formula-
tion of four directives for the naturalization of law. Firstly, one should refl ect on 
the “ontological baggage” presupposed by one’s naturalization project. Secondly, 
the attempts of naturalization should stay clear of foundationalism (the search 
for the ultimate foundations of law). Thirdly, one should recognize jurisprudence 
as a branch of philosophy which safeguards one from drawing ‘direct’ conclusions 
from biology for the study of law. Finally, one should adopt an “ontological hori-
zon” that is broad enough to evaluate the resulting conception of law.
Bart Du Laing in Revisiting ‘Equality in Exchange Revisited’: Contemporary 
Evolutionary (Genetic and Cultural) Approaches to Human Behaviour and the 
Normativity of Law, tries, in effect, to argue that in the evolutionary explanation 
of law one should take into account the so-called dual inheritance theory, one of 
the rivals of the more commonly applied evolutionary psychology. To this end, 
Du Laing considers the notion of equality in exchange in contract law. He looks 
at the problem from the perspective of legal contract theory and illuminates it 
by recourse to some experiments in behavioural economics. Next, he poses the 
question of what would be the most suitable theoretical framework for the inter-
pretation of various evolutionary experiments. He argues that such a framework 
is provided by the dual inheritance theory (the gene-culture co-evolutionary the-
ory). In conclusion, he compares his approach to the conception based on evolu-
tionary psychology presented by Wojciech Załuski. 
Arthur Dyevre, in Legal Positivism and Evolutionary Psychology: Can Legal 
Positivists Learn Something from Darwin?, poses the question of whether evolu-
tionary psychology has any relevance for legal positivism. After a short presenta-
tion of evolutionary psychology, he sketches the positivistic approaches to law as 
developed by H.L.A. Hart and H. Kelsen. The hallmark of positivism, especially 
in its normativist version, is a strict delineation of the factual and normative 
problems. Thus, Dyevre argues, evolutionary psychology has little to offer legal 
positivism. The main reason for this is that positivism seems relatively uninter-
ested (or prepared for) interdisciplinary collaboration. Better is the case of legal 
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*realism, which Dyevre shows in the example of the realist studies of judicial 
behaviour. 
Radosław Zyzik, in turn, in Neurolaw. A New Paradigm in Legal Philosophy, 
asks the question of whether one can speak of a new paradigm of legal science 
based on the fi ndings of neuroscience. He analyzes the challenge of neurolaw 
from two different perspectives: the philosophical and the practical. The former 
enables one to refl ect on the possibility of modifying the jurisprudential con-
ceptual scheme by utilizing the fi ndings of neuroscience. One such possibility 
is offered in connection to the concept of a person. The current advancements 
in neuroscience lead to a new picture of personhood, one that is signifi cantly 
different that the view presupposed by the law. Zyzik also considers the prob-
lem of normative judgments and shows that neuroscience offers new ways of ac-
counting for them. Also in this case, biological developments may infl uence our 
understanding of some fundamental legal concepts. From the practical perspec-
tive, a new challenge is posed by neuroscience based lie detectors. They lead not 
only to the reconsideration of criminal procedure, but also raise important moral 
dilemmas. Zyzik concludes that the way to develop a new paradigm in legal sci-
ence, neurolaw, is wide open. He warns, however, that this project is entwined 
with serious methodological and meta-theoretical problems.
In The Question of Non Human Primates Morality, Mateusz Stępień reports 
on a range of experiments that investigate “moral” behaviour in non human 
primates. The experiments were designed to show that non human primates 
display some kind of empathy and a rudimentary sense of fairness. This experi-
mental framework sets the stage for such questions, as “Is morality an inher-
ent feature of human nature?” or “Whether or to what degree was our common 
ancestor a ‘moral being’?” This leads, ultimately, to the problem of whether mo-
rality is a purely cultural phenomenon or has irremovable biological roots. For 
Stępień, these questions may be rephrased as concerning the evolutionary origin 
of morality. From this perspective, morality may be regarded as a homologous or 
analogous evolutionary adaptation or as an instance of exaptation. He believes 
that the available data does not provide decisive arguments in this debate.
Urszula Zarosa, in Animals as Moral Agents, argues that the idea of anthro-
pocentric ethics should be abandoned. The crux of her argument lies in exploring 
a certain criterion of moral agency, namely that of feeling pain and/or pleasure. 
The conclusion is based on both meta-ethical deliberations as well as the inter-
pretation of some experimental data which shows reciprocal altruism in ani-
mals, the capacity to experience pain by animals etc. Zarosa argues that the shift 
in our perception of animals should result in a revolution concerning our under-
standing of moral obligation. This revolution, she claims, is only just beginning.
The book fi nishes with the Appendix which consists of two fi nal chapters. 
The fi rst one, by Wojciech Cyrul, discusses the psychological aspects of knowl-
edge management and explains the impact of communication technology on the 
human cognition. Cyrul argues that the way in which information is processed or 
visualized infl uences both human cognition and human behaviour. Therefore, he 
claims for a comparative analysis of knowledge management strategies intrinsic 
for particular modes of communication, especially in the context of legal practice. 
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He examines how and why different modes of communication may determine the 
standards and evaluations both of legal knowledge and legal practice. 
In the last chapter of the book, Wojciech Załuski addresses the problem of 
positive freedom and poses a question as to its role in normative discourse. First, 
he introduces the concept of positive freedom from many various philosophical 
perspectives. Then, he challenges the three main objections which can be raised 
against positive freedom, such as: irremediable vagueness of the concept; unat-
tractiveness of positive freedom as a personal ideal and the dangerousness of 
positive freedom as a political ideal. 
Some of the papers included in the volume were presented during the 
Symposium on Law and Biology held in Krakow in December 2009. We would 
like to warmly thank all participants in symposium and all those who accepted 
our invitation to contribute to this volume. We would also like to thank Aeddan 
Shaw who has done an excellent job in editing all of the texts. 
We hope to continue publishing the Studies in Philosophy of Law. The next 
volume will be devoted to the topic of normativity and will be part of the cur-
rent research project sponsored by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education 
which we are currently pursuing in our Department. We invite all those inter-
ested in further cooperation to contribute.
Krakow, March 2010
       Jerzy Stelmach
       Bartosz Brożek
       Marta Soniewicka
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